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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No.  16-1673 
 ___________ 
 
 ERIC D. CLARKSON, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States Tax Court 
 (Tax Court No. IRS-1: 27236-15) 
 Tax Court Judge:  Honorable Michael B. Thornton 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                       November 16, 2016 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: December 2, 2016) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION* 
 _________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
Appellant Eric Clarkson petitioned in Tax Court to challenge an Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) levy notice.  On motion by the IRS, the Tax Court dismissed Clarkson’s 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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petition, deciding that it was not timely filed and, thus, that the Court lacked jurisdiction 
over it.  Although we depart slightly from the Tax Court’s reasoning, we will 
nevertheless affirm its judgment. 
I. 
At issue in this case is part of the statutory process that the IRS follows before it 
can create a levy or commence an action arising out of unpaid taxes.  We begin with 
section 6212 of the Internal Revenue Code.  Subsections (a) and (b)(1) require the IRS to 
create and send a notice of deficiency—sometimes called a “90-day letter,” and 
essentially an accounting of taxes owed for a given year—to the taxpayer’s “last known 
address” by certified or registered mail.  Proper mailing of the notice of deficiency 
triggers the 90-day window of section 6213(a), during which the taxpayer can challenge 
the alleged deficiencies by petitioning in Tax Court and, at the same time, the IRS is 
prevented from making an assessment or collection on the tax.1  However, because the 
mailing of the notice is the triggering event, “receipt of the notice by the taxpayers is not 
required in order that the statutory filing period commence.”2  After the 90-day window 
closes, the IRS can pursue its assessment or levy, and the Tax Court loses jurisdiction to 
                                                 
1 See Robinson v. United States, 920 F.2d 1157, 1158 (3d Cir. 1990). 
2 Boccuto v. Comm’r, 277 F.2d 549, 552 (3d Cir. 1960). 
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entertain a late petition from the taxpayer.3 
II. 
Clarkson filed his Tax Court petition in October 2015, shortly after receiving 
notice that the IRS intended to levy his wages based on unpaid tax for the years 2003 
through 2008.  Among other arguments (which he later abandoned and which we need 
not discuss), Clarkson claimed that the IRS had not created and properly mailed to him 
notices of deficiency for those years.  He therefore argued that the levy notice and 
attempts to collect were invalid. 
The IRS moved to dismiss on the basis that Clarkson’s petition, which was filed 
more than 90 days after the challenged notices of deficiency had been mailed, was 
untimely under section 6213(a).  Accompanying the IRS’s motion was the declaration of 
its attorney, through which several exhibits were introduced into the record.4  The 
exhibits included notices of deficiency for the years in question and the corresponding 
certified mail forms—“Substitute PS Form 3877,” a privately generated bulk version of 
                                                 
3 Edwards v. Comm’r, 791 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The tax court is a court of limited 
jurisdiction . . . and its jurisdiction is predicated on both the issuance of a notice of 
deficiency and the filing of a timely petition.”); Robinson, 920 F.2d at 1158, 1160.   
4 Clarkson now argues that it was improper for the Tax Court to consider the exhibits 
attached to the declaration, as the declaring attorney, who litigated the case in Tax Court, 
lacked personal knowledge of the facts contained in them.  See Clarkson Br. 23.  
Although Clarkson, who proceeded pro se before the Tax Court, did refer to the exhibits 
as “hearsay,” see App’x 220, his appellate counsel concedes that the IRS attorney’s 
personal knowledge was not raised below.  To the extent we can even reach the 
unpreserved argument, see Rushing v. Kan. City S. Ry., 185 F.3d 496, 508 & n.11 (5th 
Cir. 1999), we see no error warranting reversal.  
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the standard certified mail receipt—reflecting that the notices were sent to Clarkson’s 
address in Pemberton, New Jersey (the same address Clarkson was using on his Tax 
Court filings).  Significantly, the final postmark reflected a date in early 2011, well more 
than 90 days before Clarkson’s 2015 Tax Court petition was filed.   
In his response to the IRS’s motion, Clarkson identified alleged deficiencies in the 
PS 3877 mail forms, such as missing entries for the name of the issuing IRS employee 
and for the number of pieces received at the post office. These omissions, he claimed, 
“prov[ed] that [the IRS] did not mail out the [notices] . . . as required by” section 6212.5  
Clarkson also said that he had tried to input the certified mail numbers into the online 
tracker at usps.com and had received either “not found” messages or information that 
clearly contradicted the dates and information on the IRS’s exhibits.6 
The Tax Court sided with the IRS, granting its motion to dismiss.  Deeming the 
postal forms “properly completed,” the Tax Court found that Clarkson had not met his 
burden to show that the IRS had failed to mail the notices of deficiency to his last known 
address.7  Since Clarkson’s petition was therefore filed far outside of the 90-day window, 
the Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
III. 
On appeal, Clarkson again trains his sights on the PS 3877 forms, arguing that an 
                                                 
5 App’x 232–33.  
6 See App’x 231–32.  
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improperly completed form fails to trigger a presumption of regularity in the IRS’s 
mailing practices.  We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) and review the Tax 
Court’s determination of its own subject matter jurisdiction de novo.8 
Although Clarkson’s argument is narrow and somewhat technical, it is not without 
some possible weight.  The Tax Court has held elsewhere that “exact compliance with 
Postal Service Form 3877 mailing procedures raises a presumption of official regularity 
in favor of the Commissioner and is sufficient, absent evidence to the contrary, to 
establish that a notice of deficiency was properly mailed.”9  Assuming without deciding 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 App’x 4.  
8 Sunoco Inc. v. Comm’r, 663 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2011).  We may affirm on any basis 
supported by the record.  See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 249 n.33 (3d Cir. 
1998).  The IRS’s motion was authorized by Tax Court Rules 13(c), 40, 50, and 53, 
which when taken together allow motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction due to the 
untimely filing of a Tax Court petition.  The Tax Court appropriately allowed the parties 
to augment the record with exhibits and considered those exhibits in resolving the factual 
challenge to its jurisdiction.  See Redman v. Comm’r, 820 F.2d 209, 211 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(treating Tax Court motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as analogous to factual 
jurisdictional challenge under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)); cf. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 
F.3d 333, 346, 349 (3d Cir. 2016) (discussing review of factual challenges to jurisdiction 
presented via Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motions).   
We note that the Tax Court would have lacked jurisdiction no matter who prevailed 
below.  Had the Tax Court agreed with Clarkson, the IRS’s failure to properly mail the 
notices of deficiency would have deprived the Court of jurisdiction.  See Delman v. 
Comm’r, 384 F.2d 929, 934 (3d Cir. 1967) (“It is true that unless a notice of deficiency is 
mailed to the taxpayer the Tax Court may not acquire jurisdiction over the cause.”).  Such 
an outcome, however, would have also affected the IRS’s ability to assess and collect.  
Thus, the “consequences of dismissal [would] differ depending on the [Tax C]ourt’s 
reasoning.”  Edwards, 791 F.3d at 6. 
9 Hoyle v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 463, 468 (2011) (emphasis added). 
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that the missing elements identified by Clarkson amount to something less than “exact 
compliance,”10 they call into question the Tax Court’s conclusion here that the substitute 
PS 3877 forms were “properly completed” and thus that the IRS is to be afforded its 
presumption of proper mailing. 
Even without its presumption, however, the IRS can still prevail so long as it 
provides “otherwise sufficient” evidence of mailing.11  Broadly speaking, the more 
documentation presented by the IRS, the less likely that minor errors or omissions will 
defeat its proffer.12  And when “the existence of a notice of  deficiency is not in dispute,” 
as is the case here, all that is required is “evidence corroborating an actual timely mailing 
of the notice of deficiency.”13 
The relevant case law falls decisively in favor of the IRS, even in those instances 
where the omissions or errors were more egregious than those identified by Clarkson 
here.  In O’Rourke v. United States, for instance, the Second Circuit decided that a “torn, 
                                                 
10 We observe that section 4.8.9.11.3 of the Internal Revenue Manual, which is available 
at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-008-009-cont01.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2016), appears to set forth requirements for Form 3877 completion that do not include the 
deficiencies identified by Clarkson.  Other courts, though, have found that the failure of 
the PS 3877 form to reflect the number of pieces of mail received by the Post Office 
“render[s] [the form] improperly completed.”  O’Rourke v. United States, 587 F.3d 537, 
541 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  We will proceed under the assumption that it does.  
11 Welch v. United States, 678 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
12 See id. at 1377–78 (collecting cases; among them, Coleman v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 82, 
91–92 (1990)). 
13 Id. 
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partial copy of the notice [of deficiency] and a certified mail log”—the former was 
unsigned and incomplete, and the latter failed to set forth the number of mailed items and 
did not contain a postal employee’s signature—passed the “otherwise sufficient” 
threshold.14  The Tenth Circuit followed O’Rourke in Cropper v. Commissioner, holding 
that the IRS had provided otherwise sufficient evidence when 1) the PS 3877 forms 
exhibited the same “minor defects” as those in O’Rourke, but otherwise showed the date 
they were submitted to the Postal Service for mailing; and 2) the IRS had produced 
copies of the relevant notices of deficiency.15  By contrast, in Knudson v. Commissioner, 
a Tax Court case cited by Clarkson, the petitioner overcame an IRS motion for summary 
judgment when, in addition to those “minor defects,” the “PS Form 3877 in the record 
relating to the notice of deficiency . . . d[id] not identify the listed items as notices of 
deficiency or the years to which the documents relate.”16  Knudson is thus plainly 
distinguishable.  
Here, all notices of deficiency appear to be accounted for.  The PS 3877 omissions 
identified by Clarkson are comparatively minor; each form bears the appropriate 
signature, corresponds with a notice of deficiency elsewhere in the record, and shows the 
date of mailing.  Clarkson does not contend to the contrary.  Accordingly, we have no 
                                                 
14 O’Rourke, 587 F.3d at 540–42.   
15 Cropper v. Comm’r, 826 F.3d 1280, 1286 (10th Cir. 2016).  We note, as did the IRS, 
that Cropper was brought by the same attorney who now represents Clarkson.  
16 Knudsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2015-69, 14–15 (2015). 
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trouble concluding that the IRS has produced otherwise sufficient evidence to prevail on 
its motion to dismiss.17  
IV. 
In light of the above, we agree with the Tax Court that Clarkson’s petition was 
filed after the jurisdictional 90-day period had run.  The Tax Court therefore lacked 
jurisdiction, and we will affirm its order dismissing Clarkson’s petition.  
                                                 
17 Clarkson’s sole riposte involves his efforts to use usps.com to track each of the 
certified mail numbers.  See Clarkson Br. 18–19.  The IRS argues that USPS records are 
not kept in perpetuity.  See IRS Br. 28–29.  In any event, Clarkson’s exhibits would not 
affect our decision in this context.  
